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PREFERENTIAL TRANSFERS ON THE EVE OF
THE BANKRUPTCY AMENDMENTS
Richard M. Kohn*
1. Introduction
According to Professor Grant Gilmore,' Section 9-108 of the Uniform
Commercial Code2 has been characterized by some observers as "an al-
most laughably naive attempt to perpetrate a fraud on the Bankruptcy
Act." The "fraud" was aimed at Section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act,a which
gives the trustee in bankruptcy the power to avoid, as "preferential", trans-
fers of property "for or on account of an antecedent debt" made by a debtor
while insolvent and within four months prior to his bankruptcy. Partially
as a result of an internal inconsistency in the language of Article 9, Section
60 casts a distressing shadow over certain security interests in after-ac-
quired property. According to Section 9-204(3) of the Code, "a security
agreement may provide that collateral, whenever acquired, shall secure all
obligations covered by the security agreement." If, on May 1, A lends B
$100,000 secured by all of B's accounts receivable and inventory "now in
existence or hereafter acquired", it is arguable that A's security interest in
all of the collateral arose on May 1. Yet Section 9-204(1) stipulates,
inter alia, that a security interest cannot be created until the debtor has
"rights in the collateral." Thus under that section, A receives his security
interest in a piecemeal fashion, as new receivables and inventory are ac-
quired. Since there is a time gap between the original advance of $100,000
and the subsequent "transfers", the transfers are technically for antecedent
*Mr. Kohn is a member of the Editorial Board of Prospectus.
12 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 1309 (1965).
2 Section 9-108 provides:
When After-Acquired Collateral Not Secur-
ity for Antecedent Debt. Where a secured party
makes an advance, incurs an obligation, releases
a perfected security interest, or otherwise gives
new value which is to be secured in whole or in
part by after-acquired property his security in-
terest in the after-acquired collateral shall be
deemed to be taken for new value and not as
security for an antecedent debt if the debtor ac-
quires his rights in such collateral either in the
ordinary course of his business or under a con-
tract of purchase made pursuant to the security
agreement within a reasonable time after new
value is given.
3 11 U.S.C. 96 (1963).
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debt. If any of these transfers take place within four months prior to B's
bankruptcy, at a time when A has reasonable cause to know of B's in-
solvency,4 a preference has arguably taken place.
Section 9-108 was fashioned by the draftsmen of the Code to insulate
such transfers from attack under Section 60. It provides that certain
security interests in after-acquired property are deemed to be taken for
new value and not as security for an antecedent debt.
Recent cases have made it clear that the "fraud" perpetrated by Section
9-108 has to some extent succeeded: to date, three U.S. District Courts
have upheld the validity, in bankruptcy proceedings, of security interests
in after-acquired property. 5 Yet despite these decisions, Section 9-108 of
the Code and Section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act are left in an uncomfort-
able limbo. Proponents of the Bankruptcy Act will never be convinced
that the words of a federal statute can somehow be modified by a chorus
of forty-nine state legislatures. Neither will they submit easily to the view
that the "conflict" between the two sections is a conflict of words alone,
and that the two provisions represent essentially consistent judgments of
policy. Equally important, Bankruptcy Act proponents are probably fearful
that the judicial resolution which has emerged from Rosenberg, Portland
and White6 will serve as a base-point from which even greater attacks upon
the preference provisions can be launched by the courts.
Hence, while secured lenders may be content to ride the crest of current
judicial legislation, the only permanent solution to the problem lies in
amending either the Bankruptcy Act, the Uniform Commercial Code, or
both. This at least is the view taken by the National Bankruptcy Confer-
ence's Committee on Coordination of the Uniform Commercial Code and
Bankruptcy Act. 7 Since its first meeting in June 1966, the Committee has
focused its attention primarily upon the validity, in bankruptcy proceedings,
of Article 9 security interests in after-acquired property. In September
1967, the Committee submitted to the Bankruptcy Conference its first draft
of a revision of Section 60(a) of the Bankruptcy Act. This Draft was ap-
4 This requirement is supplied by Section 60(b), and is discussed at p. 268 intra.
5 Rosenburg v. Rudnick, 262 F. Supp. 635 (D.C. Mass. 1967); In re Portland News-
paper Publishing Co., 271 F. Supp. 395 (D.C. Ore. 1967); In re White, Bank-
ruptcy No. 46,711 (D.C. Ohio 1967), 4 UCC Rep. 972.
6 Id.
7 At the present time the Committee members are: Prof. Grant Gilmore (Chairman),
University of Chicago Law School; Herbert H. Anderson, Esq., Portland, Ore-
gon; Peter F. Coogan, Esq., Boston, Massachusetts; Prof. Vern Countryman,
Harvard Law School; Leon S. Foreman, Esq., Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Prof.
Frank Kennedy, University of Michigan Law School; Prof. Stefen A. Riesenfeld,
University of California Law School (Boalt Hall); George M. Treister, Esq.,
Los Angeles, California; Referee Elmore Whitehurst, U.S. District Court, N.D.
of Texas. The following individuals are presently serving in an advisory capac-
ity with the Committee: Prof. Robert Braucher, Harvard Law School; Prof.
Homer Kripke, New York University Law School; and Prof. Harold Marsh,
UCLA Law School.
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proved in terms of its "general approach."s Since that time the Draft has
undergone significant modifications, and will doubtless undergo many more
before it is finally submitted to Congress. Yet it is not premature to ex-
amine the general direction in which the Committee is moving.
It would be both unrealistic and impossible to "freeze" the current Com-
mittee discussion in order to examine its progress at a given point in time.
At this point it would be more pertinent to focus upon the basic changes
which have been proposed or considered for Section 60 by the Committee,
some of which have already been incorporated into the Draft. This article
will deal primarily with the Committee's treatment of security interests in
after-acquired property, but will also touch upon various proposed modi-
fication of Section 60 which do not directly affect the after-acquired
property problem.
II. Security Interests in After-Acquired Property
The Draft Amendments stipulate, with certain significant exceptions
discussed below, that transfers of inventory and receivables pursuant to the
terms of a properly perfected security agreement and within four months
prior to bankruptcy shall not constitute preferences, provided that the re-
ceivables arose and the inventory was acquired by the debtor in the
ordinary course of his business.
This rule is qualified by a "two-point" test: there shall be a preference
to the extent that the aggregate value of the inventory or receivables, or
both, subject to the security agreement on the date the petition in bank-
ruptcy is filed, exceeds the aggregate value subject to the security agreement
precisely four months earlier. Under the two-point test a preference is
measured solely by reference to these two points in time, irrespective of
fluctuations in the collateral which may occur within the four month period.
In order to discuss the various possible preferential situations which can
arise under the two-point test, it will be helpful to isolate two distinct sorts
of financing arrangements. The arrangement which has served as a hypo-
thetical straw-man for most of the legal dialogue in this area consists of a
single advance of funds secured by inventory and/or receivables "now in
existence or hereafter acquired." The second financing arrangement con-
sists of a series of advances secured by periodic transfers of inventory and/
or receivables. This so-called "revolving" loan arrangement is the most com-
mon form of receivable and inventory financing. The periodic advances made
against a constantly changing mass of collateral may serve as present con-
sideration for the transfers; in such a case, a clear-cut threat of transfer
S SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS OF NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY CONFEREFNCE, 1967 AN-
NUAL MEETING AT WASHINGTON, D.C., Sept. 15-16, 1967. Resolution No. I pro-
vides: "Resolved, that the Conference approves the general approach taken by
the Committee on Coordination of the Uniform Commercial Code and Bank-
ruptcy Act with respect to revision of Bankruptcy Act Section 60(a)."
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for antecedent debt is obviated. 9 Yet the shadow of preference lurks about
these revolving arrangements in more subtle and complex ways.10
A. The Single Advance
If A loans B $100,000 secured by all inventory and receivables "now
in existence or hereafter acquired", and the aggregate value of inventory
and receivables remains constant throughout the four-month period, there
will be no preference under the two-point test.
To this extent the Draft Amendments incorporate the holding of the
well-known Portland case." In that case, a total advance12 of $55,300
was made against existing and after-acquired accounts. The aggregate face
value of billed receivables subject to the security agreement when the
trustee undertook collection was $141,463.48, while the aggregate value at
the beginning of the four-month period was $144,255.70. While a two-
point test was not explicitly articulated in the court's opinion, the court was
obviously impressed by the fact that the creditor did not "improve his
position" during the four-month period. 3
It must be emphasized that the Draft's two-point test looks only to the
aggregate value of collateral at the beginning and end of the four-month
period and is not affected by fluctuations in value during that period. Thus,
if the aggregate value of collateral subject to the security agreement is
$100,000 four months prior to the petition, rises to $150,000 two months
later, and finally settles back to $100,000 on the date the petition is filed,
a preference will not result under the two-point test. Similarly, there will
be no preference if, instead of rising during the four-month period, the
collateral sinks to $75,000.
All increases in value measured by the two-point test are stigmatized as
preferential under the Draft Amendments.'4 While prior versions of the
Amendments explicitly insulated certain increases in value from attack,' 5
9 See 2 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 1309 (1965), "In-
ventory and receivables financing arrangements have rarely run the §60 gauntlet
.. for the very good reason that such arrangements . .. have been carried out
on a new value or revolving credit basis. The lender has given a 'new and con-
temporaneous consideration' against each account as it arises, and against each
item of inventory as it comes in
10 See p. 265 infra.
" In re Portland Newspaper Publishing Co., 271 F. Supp. 395 (D.C. Ore. 1967),
presently pending on appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit (No. 1148 filed Apr. 2, 1968).
12 Although two advances were actually made by the lender, the advances were suffi-
ciently close in time to be regarded as a single advance for our purposes.
13 271 F. Supp. at 401.
14 Of course, to. the extent that the debtor is fully collateralized throughout the four-
month period, an increase in the aggregate value of the collateral will not be
stigmatized as preferential under the two-point test.
15 E.g., increases resulting from fluctuating market values of collateral, from acces-
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these exemptions were not included in subsequent drafts, primarily to
facilitate administration of the two-point test. It is at least arguable, how-
ever, that the price to be paid for ease of administration is a series of
potential inequities:
Accession and the Conversion of Inventory into Receivables. Under the
two-point test an increase in the aggregate value of collateral measured at
the beginning and end of the four-month period is preferential to the extent
it results from accession 16 and the conversion of inventory into receivables.
While the ostensible purpose of the two-point test is to prevent a creditor
from improving his position vis-a-vis the debtor's estate, it is arguable that
increases in value resulting from accession and conversion of inventory
into receivables do not reflect an improvement of the creditor's position.
A sophisticated commercial lender evaluates a prospective borrower as a
"going concern" and not as a mere aggregation of lifeless assets and lia-
bilities. In other words, in initially determining the feasibility of making
the loan, the lender takes into account the potential increases in the value
of the inventory which will result from accessions and/or conversion into
receivables; for it is ultimately these increases which will enable the bor-
rower to repay the loan. To the extent that a lender relies upon such an
assessment, his "position" relative to the debtor's collateral is defined at
the outset of the loan. Thus, any increase in the aggregate value of collat-
eral resulting from accession and the conversion of inventory into receivables
is not so much an "improvement" of the creditor's position as it is a reflection
of what the creditor bargained for at the time he entered into the loan.
A useful analogy might be made to the "entity theory" of after-acquired
property. 1 7 According to this theory, a debtor's inventory and receivables
are to be viewed as a single mass - a distinct entity - as opposed to a
multitude of isolated units. A security interest in this mass can be trans-
ferred at the time the loan is made, and hence the transfer of after-acquired
property conceptually escapes characterization as a transfer for antecedent
debt. In like manner, increases in value which result from accession and
the conversion of inventory into receivables can be viewed not merely as
an aggregation of isolated increments in value, but rather as a total in-
crease in the value of collateral, an increase which was contemplated at
the outset of the loan.
sons, and from the conversion of inventory into receivables and other proceeds.
The later two are discussed infra.
I, Accession refers to the transformation of raw materials into finished goods. This
includes increases in value resulting from the application, to raw materials and
work in process, of labor, plant and equipment, research and development, and
all of the other factors which make a finished widget more valuable than its
component parts.
17 The entity theory was first articulated by Judge Magruder in Manchester Nat'l.
Bank v. Roche, 186 F.2d 827, 831 (lst Cir. 1951) (dictum) in construing the
New Hampshire Factor's Lien Act.
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It may well be argued that increases in value due to accessions or con-
version into receivables will not often be stigmatized as preferential under
the Draft. If the existing collateral at the beginning of the four-month
period includes either work in process, finished goods or receivables, the
accession and conversion values already inherent in this collateral would
provide a higher base-point from which any preference would be measured
under the two-point test. The presence of work in process, finished goods
or receivables, however, cannot be counted upon in relatively new busi-
nesses or in businesses seriously strapped for funds.
In fairness to the Draftsmen of the proposed Amendments, it must be
conceded that the detailed inquiry necessary to determine the precise ex-
tent to which an increase in value during the four-month period resulted
from accessions or conversion into receivables would place an onerous bur-
den upon the courts. Perhaps this is the ultimate justification for the
Committee's treatment of accessions and conversions. The resulting in-
equities may well be the price for practicability of administration.
Seasonal Build-ups of Collateral. A second situation in which the two-
point test may have undesirable results occurs in the context of seasonal
build-ups of inventory and receivables. A manufacturer of artificial Christ-
mas trees, for example, may conduct a significant build-up of inventory
from March through the Christmas season, generating the bulk of his
receivables in November and December.
It is possible to envision a situation in which a petition is filed against
a debtor in the middle of his peak season, at a point in time when the
aggregate value of his inventory and receivables is greatly in excess of what
it was four months prior to the filing. Yet under the two-point test there
would be a preference to the extent of the increase in aggregate value.
One can question whether this increase should be stigmatized as prefer-
ential. The debtor's inventory and receivables may well have been inade-
quate to collateralize the loan properly when it was made; as a result, the
lender may have entered into the transaction on the basis of the contem-
plated seasonal build-up. is
The likelihood of such an occurrence is of course lessened by a number
of factors. In the first place, it is unlikely that a seasonal build-up of
inventory will occur on the eve of bankruptcy. When the storm clouds
gather, a debtor will normally draw down existing stockpiles of inventory
or at least taper off acquisitions of new inventory. In the second place,
commercial lenders normally handle inventory build-ups in terms of peri-
odic advances, or else tie a single advance against inventory to a series of
advances against receivables and cross-collateralize the entire package.
The periodic advances may serve as present consideration for the inventory
as it becomes subject to the security agreement, and hence the threat of
preference can be laregly eliminated. Still, there are and always will be
18 See Hogan, Games Lawyers Play with the Bankruptcy Preference Challenge to
Accounts and Inventory Financing, 53 CORNELL L. Q. 553, 564-565 (1968).
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debtors who manage to conduct inventory build-ups on the eve of bank-
ruptcy, and lenders who make single advances against inventory alone, and
the infrequency of such occurrences across the board does not mitigate the
harshness, for the individual lender, of this particular application of the
two-point test.
Problems in Valuation. The Draft fails to define "aggregate value"-
an omission which could have serious results in the context of receivables
financing. There is often a disparity between the "face value" and the
"actual value" of a debtor's receivables during the months preceeding his
bankruptcy. The quality of new receivables might decline as the debtor
compromises his credit standards in order to sell remaining inventory. In
addition, there exists an unfortunate tendency of account debtors to de-
velop "excuses" for nonpayment upon learning of a creditor's impending
bankruptcy. 19 Yet the Draft does not indicate which form of value is to be
used in measuring a preference under the two-point test -presumably
leaving the question open for judicial interpretation.
It is unclear that either method of valuation is entirely satisfactory. The
use of face value could have harsh results for the secured lender. Receiv-
ables with a face value of $100,000 may be worth more as collateral than
receivables with a face value of $200,000, if the latter are generated on
the eve of bankruptcy and therefore more likely to be uncollectible. But
if these were the aggregate value of receivables subject to the security
agreement at the beginning and end of the four-month period respectively,
there would be a preference of $100,000 under the two-point test. An
actual value test, on the other hand, would create administrative problems.
Since the actual value of receivables can ultimately be measured only when
their collectibility is established, a wait of thirty, sixty or ninety days
might be necessary. Such a wait might be administratively unfeasible when
measuring the value of receivables subject to the security agreement on the
date of the petition. In view of the difficulties attendant upon the applica-
tion of either method of valuation, perhaps the draftsmen were wise to
leave the choice to the courts, which are in a position to balance the
equities in each individual case.
B. Revolving Loans
By focusing primarily upon the single advance situation, the law review
commentary 2 0 and the cases 2 ' have not touched upon the realities of in-
19 This tendency is especially great where the debtor gives a product warranty to his
account-debtor. See EMPLOYEES MANUAL ON METHODS AND OPERATIONS, a bulle-
tin put out by the National Commercial Finance Conference, at 17.
20 See Gordon, The Security Interest in Inventory Under Article 9 of the Uni-
form Commercial Code and the Preference Problem, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 49
(1962); King, Section 9-108 of the U.C.C., Does It Insulate the Security Interest
from Attack by a Trustee in Bankruptcy?, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 1117 (1966).
21 See Note 5 supra.
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ventory and receivable financing. As a recent issue of The Practical Lawyer
pointed out:
A discussion of bankruptcy preferences in
the context of individual transfers within
the four-month period does not carry us
far toward solution of the practical prob-
lems of loans in which collateral is as-
signed every day. Even the Portland case
• . . has little relevance. While it involved
shifting collateral, it did not involve shift-
ing debt. The real problem is far more
complicated . . . the trouble with the re-
ported cases is that they are just not real.
They don't deal with the practical case. 22
While the Draft Amendments do not address themselves specifically to
the "practical cases", it is arguable that they resolve them implicitly. Take
the following example:
On January 2, a commercial lender, C, agrees to make periodic advances
of up to 80% of the face value of D's accounts receivable. 23 Pursuant to the
loan agreement, D remits to C, in kind, all collections received from D's
account debtors. C then deducts from these collections the total of his
advance plus the applicable service charge and remits the balance, or
"equity", to D. By May 1, it has become apparent that receivables trans-
ferred in February and March are uncollectible. Since collections from
these receivables are not forthcoming, C, pursuant to the terms of his
agreement, exercises his option to retain any equity on subsequent collec-
tions from better receivables and apply them to the outstanding indebted-
ness created by the prior advances against uncollectible receivables. On
August 1, unsecured creditors of D file an involuntary petition in bank-
ruptcy.
22 13 PRAC. LAW. 56, at 57 (1967).
23 The percentage used in any given arrangement depends upon a multitude of con-
siderations, such as the debtor's financial condition and the nature of the collat-
eral. These are not factors which can be thrown into a computer to arrive at
an optimum percentage. Rather, they gain meaning in the hands of an experi-
enced lender. Eighty percent is not an uncommon figure in receivable financing,
although it may go as low as thirty, and occasionally as high as one hundred.
One yardstick is the prime cost to the borrower of the product covered by the
receivable, which often turns out to be around 80%. The debtor's normal rates
of discounts, returns and allowances may also affect the percentage. The higher
these rates are, the lower the percentage advanced. (EMPLOYEES' MANUAL ON
METHODS AND OPERATIONS, pp. 8 and 13. See Note 19 supra.)
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It is possible to argue that a preference has taken place, since the ap-
plication of the "equity" proceeds to an indebtedness arising from prior
advances can be analogized to a transfer for antecedent debt. The prefer-
ence might be increased if C, upon realizing that continued advances of
80% would be unrealistic in view of the poor quality of D's receivables,
reduces his loan-to-collateral ratio from 80% to 60% and applies the
entire 40% equity against outstanding debt.2 4
Since the Draft's two-point test looks only to the value of collateral at
the beginning and end of the four-month period, it would appear that the
conduct of the hypothetical lender would not create a preference in either
situation. In the first case, where C has applied the 20% equity to past
indebtedness, it is arguable that such equity constitutes an addition to
collateral. However, there would still be no preference under the two-point
test so long as the aggregate value of collateral on the date of the petition
is equal to or less than the aggregate value four months earlier. In the
second case, where C has reduced the loan-to-collateral ratio, there would
also be no preference under the Draft Amendments, since the adjustment
serves only to reduce the indebtedness which D can subsequently incur
and does not affect the value of collateral subject to the security agreement.
This result finds support in the Uniform Commercial Code. As we have
seen, 25 Section 9-204(3) sanctions security interests in after-required prop-
erty. Within the context of revolving loans, this means that all receivables
and inventory against which an advance is made serve as collateral not
only for that advance, but for all prior advances made under the terms
of the security agreement. In order to find a preference in the revolving
loan situation, it is necessary to view the entire financing arrangement con-
ceptually as a series of smaller financing arrangements, each consisting of
a single advance secured by a specific assignment of collateral. Only in this
way can the advances made prior to the four-month period be considered
"antecedent." Yet section 9-204(3) suggests an entirely different con-
ceptual approach to revolving loans. Such arrangements are not viewed as
a series of small financing arrangements, but as one entire arrangement -
a series of advances secured by a flow of collateral. Advances and collateral
interact as a single organism. In this posture the very concept of "ante-
cedent debt" loses meaning.
Further support for the above interpretation of the Draft's treatment of
revolving loans is lent by the Portland case. While Portland did not deal
specifically with a revolving loan situation, it impliedly went much further
24 A recent pre-Code case, Shaw v. Walter E. Heller & Company, 385 F2d 353
(5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, _ _ U.S. - 36 L.W. 3382 (April
4, 1968), resolved this issue in favor of the trustee in bankruptcy. This opin-
ion will doubtless be the subject of much criticism. One knowledgeable bank-
ruptcy attorney has already nominated it as the "overall worst opinion of the
year."
25 See p. 259, supra.
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on its facts. In Portland, no advances whatsoever were made during the
four months preceeding bankruptcy. If there is no preference in that situ-
ation, there is a fortiori no preference where at least some new value is
given in the form of periodic advances, whether the advances are made at
80% of the face value of receivables, or only 60% .26
III. Other Aspects of the Draft Amendments
A. Definition of Preference: the "Reasonable Cause to Believe"
Requirement
Under present law, a preference is defined in terms of eight elements.
Seven of these are set forth in Section 60(a)(1): there must be (1) a
transfer, (2) of any property of the debtor, (3) to or for the benefit of a
creditor, (4) for or on account of an antecedent debt, (5) made or suffered
by the debtor while insolvent, (6) within four months before the filing of
the petition in bankruptcy, (7) the effect of which transfer will be to
enable such creditor to obtain a greater percentage of his debt than some
other creditor of the same class. An eighth element is supplied by Section
60(b): at the time of the transfer the transferee must have at least reason-
able cause to believe the debtor to be insolvent.
The latest Draft has carried forward the first seven elements without
change. It appears, however, that the "reasonable cause to believe" ele-
ment may be eliminated by the Draft Committee. 2 7 This is not an uncon-
troversial proposal. The requirement that the creditor have at least reason-
able cause to believe the debtor to be insolvent has provided an often
crucial factual defense, and the elimination of this defense will not find
ready acceptance among secured lenders. 28 On the other hand, such a step
would significantly lighten the burden of proof on the trustee, and hence
the burden of time and energy on the bankruptcy court.
26 This analogy was used recently by the U.S. District Court in Florida in In re
Gibson Supply Co. Inc., No. 1619-P (D.C. Fla. Dec. 20, 1967), Mer., in a
case involving a standard revolving receivable financing arrangement. Even prior
to the four-month period, the finance company began to reduce its advances to
Gibson. Finally, advances were cut off completely at a point, coincidentally, just
prior to the beginning of the four-month period. During the next four months,
collections from receivables were applied by the lender to reduce the outstanding
debt. A charge of preference was levelled by the trustee as to the entire collec-
tions during the four-month period. According to counsel for the finance com-
pany, the referee had indicated that he would accept the trustee's argument.
While he was deliberating, the U.S. District Court in Oregon handed down its
opinion in Portland reversing the earlier decision by Referee Snedecor. A short
time later, allegedly on the basis of Portland, the Florida referee denied the
trustee's claim for preference.
27 One of the two resolutions passed by the Bankruptcy Conference in September
1967 gave the Committee authority to "consider the revision of the other sub-
divisions of Section 60 (other than Section 60(a) ( ))."
2s The response from the few commercial lenders to whom this possibility was posed
fully bears out this prediction.
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It is not a simple matter to forecast the effect which such an amendment
will ultimately have. At first blush it would appear that the sole effect will
be to favor the trustee, and hence unsecured creditors, at the expense of
secured lenders. Yet such an appraisal may be misleading. Secured lend-
ers such as banks and finance companies are often reluctant to abandon
a troubled debtor, even as the storm clouds of bankruptcy gather, in the
hope that together they can turn the tide of the debtor's financial woes.
The natural response of secured lenders to the elimination of such a tra-
ditional legal stronghold as the "reasonable cause" requirement would be
to lessen this reluctance. More debtors would be left floundering, the
lines to the bankruptcy courts would become longer, and the newfound
economies in judicial time and energy would be minimized if not utterly
lost. 29
The deletion of the "reasonable cause" element is just one aspect of an
amendment which, in many other ways, is favorable to secured lenders, and
it may well be that a receptive reaction to the whole will temper opposition
to the "reasonable cause" deletion. Various proposals for mitigating the
effect of the deletion are under consideration:
1) Reduce the time period during which a
preference can occur from four months
to possibly forty-five days. 30
2) Insulate small transfers (e.g., transfers
of $1,000 or less) during the prefer-
ential period. 3 1
3) Modify the "reasonable cause" require-
ment to create a presumption that the
creditor had reasonable cause to be-
lieve the debtor to be insolvent upon
a showing by the trustee that the deb-
tor had made a preferential transfer
during the crucial period.
B. When the Transfer Takes Place: the "Good Faith
Purchaser" Test
In order to determine whether a particular transfer constitutes a prefer-
ence, the point in time at which the transfer took place must be established.
2.9 On the other hand, lenders might feel that an early abandonment of a troubled
debtor might be imprudent simply because it might catapult the debtor immedi-
ately into bankruptcy with the result that transfers during the prior four month
period might be struck down as preferences.
30 This would involve a change in the definition of a preference (Section 60(a)(1))
and also in the definition of an act of bankruptcy (Section 3(b)).
3t It is arguable that this modification accomplishes little, since under present prac-
tice such small transfers are rarely attacked by the trustee.
December 1968]
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The present Bankruptcy Act makes this determination by providing cer-
tain acts of perfection which must occur in order for a transfer to be
deemed to have taken place. Present Section 60(a) (2) sets forth two tests
of perfection, one for real property and one for personal property. A trans-
fer of real property is deemed to have taken place "when it became so far
perfected that no subsequent bona fide purchase from the debtor could
create rights in such property superior to the rights of the transferee."
A transfer of personal property, on the other hand, is deemed to have
occurred "when it became so far perfected that no subsequent lien upon
such property obtainable by legal or equitable proceedings on a simple
contract could become superior to the rights of the transferee." The test for
personal property is presently supplemented by Section 60(a) (6) which
provides that certain equitable liens which may have been effective against
a lien creditor are not sufficiently perfected to withstand the threat of
preference.
The use of the "good faith purchaser" test for real property and the
"lien creditor" test for personal property has complicated the verbiage of
section 60 (i.e., by making necessary much of the cumbersome language
of Sections 60(a)(3), (4), and (5),32 and has created legal problems as
3 2 Section 60(a)(3):
The provisions of paragraph (2) (governing the
time of transfer) shall apply whether or not
there are or were creditors who might have ob-
tained such liens upon the property other than
real property transferred and whether or not
there are or were persons who might have be-
come bona fide purchasers of such real property.
Section 60(a)(4): A lien obtainable by legal or equitable pro-
ceedings upon a single contract within the
meaning of paragraph (2) is a lien arising in
ordinary course of such proceedings upon the
entry or docketing of a judgment or decree,
or upon attachment, garnishment, execution,
or like process, whether before, upon, or after
judgment or decree and whether before or
upon levy. It does not include liens which un-
der applicable law are given a special priority
over other liens which are prior in time.
Section 60(a)(5): A lien obtainable by legal or equitable pro-
ceedings could become superior to the rights
of a transferee or a purchase could create
rights superior to the rights of a transferee
within the meaning of paragraph (2), if such
consequences would follow only from the
lien or purchase itself, or from such lien or
purchase followed by any step wholly within
the control of the respective lien holder or pur-
chaser, with or without the aid of ministerial
action by public officials. Such a lien could not,
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well (i.e., problems relating to the classification of fixtures, and other kinds
of property possessing the characteristics of both realty and personalty.)
Under the latest version of the Draft Amendments, the two tests have
been replaced by a single "good faith purchaser" test for both real and
personal property. According to this test, a transfer is deemed to have
taken place when it has been perfected under applicable state law against
subsequent purchasers of the property who are not entitled to "special
priority." Purchasers entitled to special priority include (1) certain pur-
chasers against whom a transferee cannot perfect under applicable state
law (i.e., a buyer in the ordinary course of trade, a holder in due course
of negotiable instruments, a good faith purchaser of investment securities
or negotiable documents of title or chattel paper, a holder of a purchase
money security interest in goods or fixtures, or a lienor who has furnished
services or materials with respect to the property) and (2) certain pur-
chasers against whom the transferee could have perfected by taking further
action, but did not (i.e., a buyer of consumer goods or farm equipment
under Section 9-307(2) of the Code). The substitution of this single test
not only obviates the need for Subsections 60(a) (4), 60(a) (5) and part of
60(a) (3) but also eliminates problems of classification concerning fix-
tures. 3 3
C. The Grace Period for Perfection
Under the present Bankruptcy Act, a transfer is deemed to have taken
place when certain acts of perfection have been accomplished. Section
60(a) (7) provides a grace period for perfection: if the required acts of
perfection are performed within the grace period, the transfer shall relate
back to the time it actually took place. The length of this period depends
upon the law of each state. If the applicable state law provides for a period
of 21 days or less in which a particular act of perfection must take place
in order for perfection to relate back to the time of the transfer, Section
60(a) (7) adopts the grace period provided by state law. If, on the other
hand, the applicable state law does not provide a grace period or provides
however, become so superior and such a pur-
chase could not create rights for the purposes
of paragraph (2) through any acts subsequent
to the obtaining of such a lien or subsequent to
such a purchase which require the agreement or
concurrence of any third party or which re-
quire any further judicial action, or ruling.
: It might appear that the use of a bonafide purchaser test makes subsection 60(a)
(6) expendable, since that subsection merely qualifies the present lien-creditor
test for personal property. Yet Section 60(a) (6) is ultimately made expendable
by the perfection requirements of Article 9, under which equitable liens cannot
survive. If, for example, the Committee had used a single lien-creditor test in-
stead of a bonafide purchaser test, present Section 60(a)(6) would still be
unnecessary.
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one which exceeds 21 days, Section 60(a) (7) applies a 21-day period. 34
Present Section 60(a) (8) supplements 60(a) (7) by providing that where
no act of perfection is required by applicable state law (as in the case of
certain automatically perfected security interests under the Code) 3 5 the
transfer shall be deemed to have occurred at the time the transfer actually
took place. In so doing the Bankruptcy Act recognizes the validity of such
automatically perfected security interests.
The latest Draft of the proposed amendments carries forward, with one
important change, the import of present Sections 60(a) (7) and 60(a) (8).
The one difference is the substitution of a strict 21-day period which will
not be cut back even though state law provides a shorter period. The ar-
gument that such a modification will encourage laxity in the perfecting of
security interests seems to be adequately countered by the fact that the 21-
day period is relevant only for the purposes of Section 60 and does not
in any way insulate security interests from attack by liens and other com-
peting interests.
D. Enabling Advances
Under the present Bankruptcy Act, a transfer within the four-month
period will not be stigmatized as preferential to the extent it is made for
new and contemporaneous consideration. Thus, an extension of credit or
advance of funds made to enable a debtor to acquire inventory or equip-
ment is generally insulated from attack as a preference.
The Draft Amendments in effect crystalize this protection by providing
that there shall be no preference to the extent new value3 6 is given pursu-
ant to a properly perfected security agreement to enable a debtor to acquire
property so long as the property is acquired within a reasonable period
of time.
This proposal essentially incorporates the concept of a "purchase-money
security interest" which appears in Article 9,37 with the one significant
variation that the proposal does not incorporate the requirement set forth
in Section 9-107 that the proceeds of the advance to the debtor be "in fact
so used" to purchase the property in which the security interest is taken.
The Draft merely requires that the advance be made to enable the debtor
to acquire the property within a reasonable time thereafter. What in fact
34 The UCC is of course the "applicable state law" governing security interests in
personal property in 49 states and the District of Columbia. Although the UCC
generally does not provide a grace period for perfection (cf. purchase-money
security interests in collateral other than inventory), the 21-day grace period
supplied by Section 60(a)(7) is generally thought to apply. 2 GILMORE supra,
note 2 at 1327.3 5See UCC Section 9-302(1)(a)-(f).
36 The term "new value" replaces the present term "new and contemporaneous con-
sideration" and represents an attempt to mesh more closely the language of the
UCC and the Bankruptcy Act.
37 See UCC Section 9-107: Definitions: "Purchase-Money Security Interest."
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constitutes a reasonable time is not defined in the Draft -presumably left
open for judicial interpretation.
E. Set-off
Present Section 60(c) of the Bankruptcy Act provides the creditor with
a right of set-off in the event that a preferential transfer is followed by an
extension of unsecured credit to the debtor. It states:
If a creditor has been preferred, and
afterward in good faith gives the debtor
further credit without security of any kind
for property which becomes a part of the
debtor's estate, the amount of such new
credit remaining unpaid at the time of the
adjudication in bankruptcy may be set off
against the amount which would other-
wise be recoverable from him.
One basic shortcoming of this provision, from the standpoint of the
secured lender, is its requirement that the subsequent extension of credit
be "without security of any kind." If a particular creditor has been pre-
ferred to the extent of $10,000, and thereafter advances $5,000 to the
debtor secured by only $2,500 of collateral, there would be no set-off under
Section 60(c) even though only half of the $5,000 advance was secured.
Dissatisfaction with this result has caused various members of the Com-
mittee to favor a revision of present Section 60(c). Under the present
Draft a set-off rule has been included as part of the proposed Section
60(a). The Draft uses a more equitable "net result" formula, whereby an
otherwise preferential transfer will be reduced by the amount by which
subsequent advances exceed any contemporaneous consideration which se-
cures those advances.
IV. Conclusion
The Draft Amendments emerge as a mixed blessing for secured lenders.
On the one hand, the Amendments insulate certain security interests in
after-acquired property from attack as preferences. On the other hand, this
protection is cut short by an almost antiseptic two-point test. The position
of secured lenders is further threatened by the proposed elimination of the
"reasonable-cause-to-believe" requirement. Yet the success of the Draft
Amendments is ultimately a political question, and the "give and take"
approach of the Draft Amendments offers a politically realistic resolution
of the "conflict" between Section 9-108 of the Uniform Commercial Code
and Section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act.
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